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Abstract
The control structure over money and real assets is considered in
the process of cost innovation. The work here contrasts with the first
part of this paper where the emphasis was on the physical aspects
of innovation. Here the emphasis is primarily on the money supply
aspects of innovation. We conclude with observations on evaluation
and the locus of control in the process of innovation.
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1 Finance and Innovation
The specific “value-added” to the topics of innovation, control, and own-
ership attempted here is to start to bridge the mathematical gap between
general equilibrium theory and Schumpeter’s writings on innovation. In the
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past twenty to thirty years there have been considerable writing and empiri-
cal work on innovation and the economic and behavioral questions it raises,
see for example Arthur [2] , Dosi et al. [8], Bechtel et al. [5], Baumol [4],
Lamoreaux and Sololoff [10], Day [6], Eliasson and Wihlborg [7], Nelson [11],
Nelson and Winter [12], Shubik [13] and in particular the essay of Day. The
work here is aimed at being complementary with these but aimed specifi-
cally at trying to characterize mathematically via a dynamic programming
formulation of strategic market games the monetary aspects of innovation
eventually including ownership, financial control, and coordination features
of a market economy.
1.1 Physical and financial assets, innovation and equi-
librium?
This paper is addressed specifically to cost innovation and the breaking of the
circular flow of funds. It considers some of the problems of the interaction
between ownership and control. Although written to stand alone, it is based
directly on two essays, one dealing with equilibrium in a closed monetary
economy without innovation [9] and the other concerned with the physical
good aspects of innovation in a Robinson Crusoe Economy [14]. In Section 3
the basic structure of the monetary economy and its dynamic equilibria are
noted. In particular the role of the money interest rate as a control variable
emerges in this setting. The earlier paper [14] is more or less a straightforward
exercise in operations research where in a non-market, non-monetary setting
Robinson Crusoe has to evaluate how to give up physical assets needed for
use in a risky innovation.
In our deconstruction of the investment decision there are five features
that merit individual analysis; they are:
1. Equilibrium in a closed monetary economy prior to the knowledge that
innovation is feasible;
2. Innovation in a Robinson Crusoe setting, involving only physical assets;
3. Innovation in a closed monetary economy with only short term assets
investigating the need for the expansion of money and credit;
4. The roles of long term capital assets, locus of control, evaluation and
funding for innovation; and
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5. The implications of continuing innovation for the distribution of firm
size and investment.
As has been noted above the first two topics have been dealt with in
separate essays. We limit our analysis here to the third item in order to
make explicit the monetary flows and their control. We comment on the last
two features of innovation in Sections 6 and 7, in the expectation that we
and others will deal with these central aspects of control and valuation in a
competitive innovating economy.
One of our goals is to provide some suffi ciently tractable examples that
can serve as a basis for experimental games.
2 Open and ClosedMonetary Economies with
Different Agents
Prior to constructing a fully closed model, an open model of competitive
innovation is specified. For simplicity we keep the random component of the
innovation process to a minimum. All individuals have an opportunity to
innovate in the first period. Each individual’s success depends on the size
of her investment in innovation. After the first period there is no further
opportunity to innovate.
2.1 A preliminary open economy model
A formal model of a large group of competitive firms in a partial equilibrium
monetary economy with innovation is considered. After observations on this
we turn to the basic structure of ownership and financial control in a closed
monetary economy.
2.2 An open competitive economy with innovating in-
dividual agents
In our earlier essay [14] we studied Robinson Crusoe as an isolated single
innovator with no financial or market system existing. We then considered
the market analogue of a small individual, so small that he does not influence
market input or output prices even if he innovates. In a monetary economy
4
(unlike that of Crusoe) the firm can buy the desired inputs needed for inno-
vation or production rather than have them in inventory. Furthermore, in
general it does not produce for self-consumption, but for sales. This is tanta-
mount to saying that the even the owner-controlled firm may maximize some
function of expected profits. In this model we assume for simplicity that
the input good for production is the same as the output good, and therefore
has the same price. (Another interesting, but quite different model, would
assume the input good to be different from the output good).
Consider a continuum of small firms φ ∈ [0, 1] willing to innovate and
consider that their actions as a whole influence market price. In each of a
countable number of periods n = 1, 2, . . . each firm φ begins with a quantity






We assume that there is a demand function Φ(·) so that the price of the
goods in period n is
pn = Φ(Qn). (2)
The introduction of a demand function for the price of the produced good
allows us to avoid modeling the consumers and owners, and the circular cash
flows. However, the modeling of these features will be important in the closed
models of later sections.
At the start of each period n each firm φ holds an amount 0 of cash and
has as goods-in-process qφn. The goods are sold in the market at the start of
the period at the price pn = Φ(Qn). Each firm φ borrows an amount bφn at
the fixed interest rate ρ ≥ 0 from a central bank to finance production. The




n/pn. The loan is
short-term and must be paid back with interest at the end of the period.
All firms begin in period 1 with the same production function f1 : [0,∞) 7→
[0,∞), which is assumed to be concave, increasing, and to satisfy f1(0) = 0.
An input iφn by a firm φ at period n with production function f1 results in
the production of goods qφn+1 = f1(i
φ
n) to be sold in the following period.
If a firm φ wishes to innovate it must seek out a long-term loan cφ to
purchase an amount of input goods j = cφ/pn to use in innovation. The
firm must service the long-term loan at ρ∗cφ per period where ρ∗ is the long-
term rate of interest. The servicing of the long-term loan is deducted from
profits in each period. In the models of this paper, it is assumed that the
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decision to innovate is made at the beginning of period 1 and that there is
no opportunity to innovate at later stages of the game. (In Part 3 we will
consider models which allow for repeated attempts at innovation.)
A successful innovation attempt results in an improved production func-
tion f2 : [0,∞) 7→ [0,∞) with the same properties as f1 and such that
f2(i) ≥ f1(i) for all inputs i ≥ 0 and with strict inequality holding for some
values of i. The probability of a successful innovation is an increasing function
ξ(j) of the amount j of goods invested. The probability of failure is 1− ξ(j)
and, if failure occurs in the attempt, the firm must operate thereafter with
the original production function f1.
The (net) profit πφn of firm φ in period n is the income from its sales in
the period minus its interest payments:
πφn = pnq
φ
n − (1 + ρ)bφn − ρ∗cφ. (3)









There are limits on the size of both the short-term and the long-term loans
obtained by a firm φ. There is a fixed bound E ≥ 0 on the size of the long-
term loan cφ. The limit on the short-term loan bφn is set at (pnq
φ
n−ρ∗cφ)/(1+ρ)
in order to assure that the firm is able to pay its debts and avoid bankruptcy.
In seeking a type symmetric equilibrium for this economy, we assume
that all firms begin in period 1 with the same quantity q > 0 of goods-in-
process, make the same bid b for input goods for production, and invest the
same amount c in attempting to innovate. At the beginning of period 2,
there will be two types of firms, those called type 1 which have failed in the
attempt and must continue with the production function f1 and those called
type 2 which have succeeded and henceforth have the improved production
function f2. There will be a fraction ε = ξ(c/p1) of firms of type 2 and
ε̄ = 1− ε = 1− ξ(c/p1) of type 1 in all future periods.
In order to obtain a Bellman equation for the value of this game to a firm,
we will first consider the values for the two types in a period n ≥ 2 and then
reason by backward induction to get the equation starting at the beginning.
So suppose that at the beginning of some period after the first, type 1
firms each have goods q1 and type 2 firms have goods q2. The total quantity
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of goods for sale is then
Q = ε̄q1 + εq2, (5)
at the price p = Φ(Q). The Bellman equation for a firm of type k can be
written, for k = 1, 2, as
Wk(qk, p, c) = sup
0≤bk≤(pqk−ρ∗c)/(1+ρ)
[







where q̃k = fk(bk/p) is the quantity of goods held by the firm in the next
period and p̃ is the price of goods in the next period. Thus Q̃ = ε̄q̃1 + εq̃2 is
the quantity of goods for sale in the next period and p̃ = Φ(Q̃).
The cost ρ∗c to each firm for its long-term loan is the same in every
period. So, if we set Wk(qk, p) = Wk(qk, p, 0), it is easy to see that
Wk(qk, p, c) = Wk(qk, p)− (1 + ρ∗)c (7)
and also that
Wk(qk, p) = sup
0≤bk≤(pqk−ρ∗c)/(1+ρ)
[






Now let W (q, p) be the value function for a firm starting in period 1 and
facing the decision about how much to invest in innovation as well as in
production. Then the Bellman equation is given by
W (q, p) = sup
0≤b≤(pq−ρ∗c)/(1+ρ)
0≤c≤E




{(1− ξ(c/p))W1(q̃, p̃, c) + ξ(c/p)W2(q̃, p̃, c)}
]
, (10)
where p is the price of goods in period 1, q̃ = f1(b/p) is the amount of goods
held by the firm at the beginning of period 2 and p̃ is the price of goods in
period 2. In a type-symmetric equilibrium, all firms will begin period 2 with
the same q̃. Thus Q̃ = q̃ is also the total quantity of goods, and p̃ = Φ(Q̃).
For the open model of this section we do not describe consumer behavior
beyond the implicit behavior given in the demand function. Furthermore we
are not concerned with closure on the monetary flows that are required of a
closed model. These are addressed in Sections 5 and 6. Here the dividends
that the firm pays out disappear into a black box, as do the earnings of the
central bank.
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2.2.1 Convergence to stationary equilibrium after innovation
By a stationary equilibrium is meant a Nash equilibrium in which bids, prices
and the quantity of goods produced remain constant. After the initial shock
of innovation in the first period, the economy in our model always has a fixed
fraction ε̄ of firms with production function f1 and the remaining fraction ε
with production function f2. All firms have the same long-term debt of c ≥ 0,
which requires a payment of ρ∗c in every period. Under some additional
assumptions, there is for such an economy a unique stationary equilibrium. It
is rarely the case that the economy is in stationary equilibrium immediately
or even soon after the innovation stage, but there is, in some generality,
convergence to stationary equilibrium as the number of stages approaches
infinity.
In this section we assume that the production functions are strictly con-
cave, continuously differentiable, and that for k = 1, 2




f ′k(x) = 0. (11)
We also assume that the demand function is continuous, decreasing with
finite positive values, and that prices approach ∞ or 0 as the quantity of






Finally, we also now allow for the possibility that the profit πφ of a firm φ
may be negative in some periods. This means that the bid bk of a firm may
exceed the limit (pqk − ρ∗c)/(1 + ρ) in some periods.
Consider the Bellman equation (8) above and, for k = 1, 2, let




Recall that q̃k = fk(bk/p), so ψk(bk) is the expression inside the supremum
in (8). Standard arguments show that
∂Wk
∂qk
(qk, p) = p.
Consequently the Euler equations take the form





· f ′k(bk/p) · p̃ = 0.
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This holds if and only if




In stationary equilibrium there will be a fixed price p∗ for goods so that
p = p̃ = p∗ and
f ′k(bk/p) = (1 + ρ)
2, k = 1, 2.
The input of type k firms is i∗k = (f
′
k)
−1((1 + ρ)2) with output q∗k = fk(i
∗
k).




Theorem 1 There is a unique stationary equilibrium with the constant price
p∗ and the constant quantity Q∗ of goods produced. In every period, firms of
type k, for k = 1, 2, bid b∗k = p
∗i∗k, and produce q
∗
k.
Proof. The bids b∗k are the unique solutions to the Euler equations, and an
appropriate transversality condition is trivial because quantities and prices
are constant by stationarity.
Suppose now that the economy begins in period 1 with the fraction ε̄ of
firms of type 1 each holding the quantity q1 > 0 of goods and the fraction
ε of firms holding the quantity q2 > 0 of goods. So the initial quantity of
goods in the economy is Q = ε̄q1 + εq2 and the initial price is p = Φ(Q).
Theorem 2 If, in every period, every firm chooses its bids so that the Euler
equation (12) is satisfied, then, as the number of periods approaches infinity,
the total quantity of goods will approach Q∗, the price will approach p∗, and
the bids of type k firms will approach q∗k for k = 1, 2.
More briefly, the economy converges to its stationary equilibrium as the
number of periods converges to infinity. The proof is in an appendix.
2.2.2 A simple example for profit maximizing firms
In general, an analytic solution to the innovation model is not possible. This
is, in part, because the innovation stage forces the economy out of stationary
equilibrium. By Theorem 2 the economy will, under reasonable assumptions,
converge to a new stationary equilibrium as the number of stages approaches
infinity. In this section we consider a very simple example for which the
convergence takes only one step and an analytic solution is easy.
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Example 1 Assume that every firm φ ∈ [0, 1] begins with goods q = qφ = 2
and the production function
f1(i) =
{
2i, 0 ≤ i ≤ 1,
2, 1 < i.
(13)




qφ dφ = 2.
The price of output is given by the demand function
Φ(Q) =
{
5−Q, 0 ≤ Q ≤ 5
0, Q > 5.
So the initial price is p = 5− 2 = 3.
Consider first the situation where there is no possibility of innovation. It
is then easy to see that the optimal bid of every firm for input goods is b = 3,
and each firm then produces
q = f1(b/p) = f1(1) = 2
and earns the profit
π = pq − (1 + ρ)b = 3 · 2− (1.05) · 3 = 2.85.
Indeed, total goods remain equal to 2 and the price of goods is again 3. The
economy is in stationary equilibrium. Each firm earns the same profit in







· π = 21 · 2.85 = 59.85. (14)
Now suppose that there is the possibility of innovation at stage 1. Assume




4i, 0 ≤ i ≤ 1/2,
2, 1/2 < i.
(15)
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Note that the maximum production level remains 2, but effi ciency is increased
so that this maximum is attained with an input of 1/2 rather than 1.
Assume that the firms can obtain long-term loans at interest rate ρ∗ = .
05 in order to purchase goods to be used in the innovation process. Further
assume that if c units of money are borrowed in order to obtain j = c/p = c/3








In order to find the optimal choice for c, we will first calculate, as a function
of c, the value of the game from stage 2 onwards for both the successful and the
unsuccessful firms. Then we can use backward induction to find the optimal
value of c at stage 1.
Even with the possibility of innovation, it remains true that the optimal
bid for goods to input for production is b = p = 3. Thus every firm begins
stage 2 with goods q = f1(b/p) = f1(1) = 2. Total goods for sale are Q = 2
with price p = Φ(Q) = 3.
However, the fraction c/(c+ 3) of the firms are successful and begin stage
2 with the improved production function f2, while the remaining fraction
3/(c + 3) are unsuccessful and still have the production function f1. Call
the unsuccessful firms type 1. These firms continue to have the optimal bid
b1 = 3 with output f1(1) = 2. All firms have the same long-term debt of c.
So the profit of type 1 firms at stage 2 is
π1 = pq − (1 + ρ)b1 − ρ∗c = 3 · 2− (1.05) · 3− .05c = 2.85− .05c.
The successful firms, called type 2, have the optimal bid b2 = 3/2 with output
f2(b2/p) = f2(1/2) = 2 and profit
π2 = pq − (1 + ρ)b2 − ρ∗c = 3 · 2− (1.05) · (3/2)− .05c = 4.425− .05c.
Notice that total output remains Q = 2 and thus the price is also constant
at p = 3. The optimal bids remain the same in future periods, namely b1 = 3
for type 1 firms and b2 = 3/2 for type 2 firms. Thus profits also remain
constant and the total discounted payoffs (from stage 2 on) to the two types








· π1 = 21 · π1 = 59.85− 1.05c
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· π2 = 21 · π2 = 92.925− 1.05c
for type 2. Now we can calculate the value W (2) to a firm from the beginning
stage when all firms start at q = 2. This value is

















Take p = 3, q = 2, ρ = ρ∗ = .05, b = 3 and the values calculated above for
W1(c),W2(c) to get











Differentiate with respect to c to find the maximum at c = c∗ = 6.49. (The
bounds above in the formula for W are satisfied so long as the bound E
imposed on long-term loans is at least 6.49.) So the probability of success is
c∗/(c∗ + 3) = . 68 and
W = 2.85 +
1
1.05
{(.68) · 92.925 + (.32) · 59.85} − (1.05) · (6.49) = 74.46.
Now 74.46 > 59.85 so that overall expected profits have increased due to
innovation. However, the unsuccessful firms would have been better off had
they not tried to innovate. Indeed the total discounted profit of a type 2 firm
is just the same as in (14) minus the cost 1.05c∗ of financing the attempt.
2.3 A comment on open models
When studying a few firms or a single industry to answer questions such
as the distribution of firm size, the need to consider the full feedbacks from
a closed economy is for most purposes both unnecessary and more diffi cult
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than partial equilibrium analysis. However in order to appreciate the macro-
economic aspects of the influence of financial control and the money supply
it is necessary to consider a closed economy. It is there that the separation
among ownership, management and financing first appears with clarity and
the meaning of the breaking of the equilibrium circular flow of capital may
be illustrated.
3 The Closed Economy as a Sensing, Evalu-
ating and Control Mechanism
Prior to considering the formal closed models with innovation, several gen-
eral items that supply context are covered. A detailed sketch of the whole
closed system is presented in Figure 1; it is somewhat simplified in Figure
2 prior to the formal analysis. Figure 1 shows differentiated economic units
with some enforcement and evaluation included. Figure 11 provides an over-
all description describing how credit evaluation, clearing houses, the banks,
central bank and courts fit into the information and enforcement structure.
Institutional reality has many variations and it is easy to argue with the par-
ticular “wiring”presented here. but the purpose of this diagram is to give a
fingerspitzengefühl or an intuitive feeling of what the many realities look like.
Unlike Figure 2, three additional institutions appear. They are the clearing-
house, the credit evaluation agency (implicitly including the accountants)
and the court house. In much of economic theory expertise is ignored pri-
marily because it is too hard to deal with. In old fashioned securities analysis
and accounting due diligence and expertise is central to applications, but it
is often ignored in much of economic and finance theory. This is because it
is subsumed in modeling the risky economic instruments and entities being
dealt with as lottery tickets that have already been correctly evaluated. We
follow this extreme approximation because for our prime purpose, which is
consideration of the breaking of the circular flow of capital, even at this level
of abstraction the phenomenon still occurs.
























Figure 1: The economy with finance, clearing evaluation and enforcement
3.1 Individual or representative agents?
When there is no uncertainty, models utilizing representative agents and
models with independent agents solved for type-symmetric noncooperative
equilibria (TSNE) give the same equilibrium results. When there is any
exogenous uncertainty present this is no longer generally true. With inde-
pendent agents uncertainty is not necessarily correlated. However, with a
representative agent, uncertainty is implicitly correlated for all members of
the class. As is indicated below we consider a minimal amount of uncertainty.
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3.2 On money, credit, banks, and central banks
In institutional fact the definition and measurement of the money supply is
diffi cult at best. The distinctions between money and credit are not always
clear. Here we utilize a ruthless simplification in order to highlight the dis-
tinction between money and credit and to be able to stress economic control.
Consider money to be paper gold, or some form of blue chip in which pay-
ments are made. Credit is a contract between two entities A and B, in which
individual A delivers money at time t1 in return for an IOU or a promise
from B to repay an amount of money to A at time t2. An individual may
be a natural person or a legal person such as a firm, a bill broker, a bank, a
credit granting clearing house or a central bank.
We may consider two ways to vary the money supply. The first and
simpler is that the central bank is permitted to print it. Another way to
vary the money supply is to accept the IOU notes of commercial banks as
money. Say they are red chips, in contrast with the central bank’s blue chips.
They are accepted in payment on a 1 : 1 basis with blue chips. A reserve
ratio controls the amount a bank can issue, thus for any k units of red chips
issued, a bank must hold one unit of blue chips.2
As we wish to maintain as high a level of simplification as possible in
order to illustrate the breaking of the circular flow, we select the simpler
structure. The banking system is considered as one and called the central
bank. It has funds above its reserves3 that it can lend and it can pay interest
on deposits.4
4 The Separation of Management and Own-
ership
The next level of complexity above the single type of agent utilizes two types
of agents: managers of the firms and stockholder-owners. (In the first model
2The justification for the acceptance of reserve ratio banking is in the dynamics along
with acceptance of fiat (see for example, [3]).
3Central bank reserves in a fiat money economy are a creation of law and possibly
economic theology. Mathematically they are just societal rules of the game or an algorithm
stating how the central bank can create money. They specify its strategy set. In actuality
the strategy set is also bounded by political pressures.
4In general, central banks do not accept deposits from natural persons, but for modeling
simplicity here we permit them to do so.
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below, there is also a class of saver agents who subsist on the returns from
their bank deposits.) The economy can be interpreted as a fully defined
game of strategy where there is a finite measure of firms and of stockholder-
owners whose overall actions will influence prices. By assuming that we limit
the solution to a type symmetric noncooperative equilibrium, all agents of
each type, even though independent, will employ a strategy common to their
type. In illustrating some of the basic aspects of financing and control of
innovation, the independent agent models show microeconomic uncertainty
at the innovation stage.
5 AClosed Economy Prior to Innovation: The
Circular Flow of Money Illustrated
The model presented in this section is based on work of Karatzas et al. [9]
without innovation. It will be extended in the next section to a model with
innovation in order to consider the disequilibrium aspects of innovation on
the money supply. Out stress so far has been on non-monetary models of
Crusoe as an innovator, or on open microeconomic models. From here on
the emphasis is on simple closed economies or macroeconomic models.
5.1 A closed economy with producers, consumers, monied
individuals and a central bank
The underlying model is that of a “cash-in-advance”market economy with
a continuum of firms φ ∈ J = [0, 1] that produce goods all of which must be
put up for sale, and a continuum of stockholder agents α ∈ I = [0, 1] who own
the firms and purchase these goods for consumption. The agents hold cash
and bid for goods in each of a countable number of periods n = 1, 2, . . .. The
firms hold no cash5 and must borrow from a single outside bank to purchase
goods as input for production in every period. The bank is modeled as a
strategic dummy that accepts deposits and offers loans at a fixed interest
rate ρ. In addition to the owner agents, there may be a continuum of saver
agents γ ∈ K = [0, 1], each of whom holds cash, bids in every period to buy
goods for consumption, and subsists entirely on her savings. These agents
5This reflects the payment of the 100% dividend, the timing of which is irrelevant in a
perfect credit rating competitive economy.
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can be thought of as “retirees” or private capitalists.6 Figure 2 shows the


















Figure 2: Who controls what?
The six boxes portray an economy somewhat more complex than our
mathematics deals with, but give an intuitive insight into the spreading out
of ownership and control in a modern enterprise economy. The firms are in
general corporate, they do not own themselves. They have (at some ultimate
level) natural person stockholders who are also consumers. Directly or indi-
rectly they depend on at least four sets of decisionmakers for debt (and some
equity or options) financing. They are the passive savers, the financiers, the
commercial banks and the central bank. Without having to elaborate further
it should be evident that in any dynamic setting the coordination problem
is considerable. In the mathematical model below we grossly simplify the
financial sector, ignoring the financiers, collapsing the commercial banks and
6In a less Draconian abstraction the difference between retirees and capitalists is not
merely age, but expertise. The role of competent financing as a perception and evaluating
device cannot be over stressed.
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central bank into one and having the passive savers save in the aggregate
bank, while the firms borrow only from this bank.
The situation of the firms in this model is similar to that of the firms in
the open model of Section 2. However, the firms in this first closed model
have no opportunity to innovate and carry no long-term debt. Each firm φ
begins every period n with goods q φn that are to be sold in the market. The




Each firm φ also borrows cash bφn from a central bank, with 0 ≤ bφn ≤
(pnq
φ
n)/(1 + ρ) , where pn is the price of the good in period n and ρ > 0 is
the interest rate. There is no demand function in this model and the prices
are formed endogenously as will be explained below.





as input for production, and begins the next period with an amount of goods
q φn+1 = f(i
φ
n).
Here f(·) is a production function, which satisfies the usual assumptions.
During period n each firm φ earns the (net) profit
πφn = pnq
φ
n − (1 + ρ)bφn,
since it must pay back its loan with interest. The goal of the firm is to












The profits Πn are distributed to the owner agents in equal shares at the end
of the period.
7In institutional fact the large firm has a considerable constituency of customers, em-
ployees, the government and others as well as the owners.
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The owner agents are now considered. A typical owner agent α holds
money mαn at the beginning of each period n. The agent bids an amount
of money aαn with 0 ≤ aαn ≤ mαn + Πn/(1 + ρ), which buys him an amount
xαn = a
α
n/pn of goods for immediate consumption. Any extra money an owner
agent has is deposited and earns interest at rate ρ. The agent begins the next
period with cash
mαn+1 = (1 + ρ) (m
α
n − aαn) + Πn.




where u is a concave increasing utility function and 0 < β < 1 is a given
discount factor.
Also considered is a typical saver agent γ, who holds mγn in cash at the
start of period n. The saver bids an amount cγn of cash with 0 ≤ cγn ≤ mγn,
which buys him a quantity yγn = c
γ
n/pn of goods, and starts the next period
with
mγn+1 = (1 + ρ) (m
γ
n − cγn)
in cash. If v(·) is his utility function, with the same properties as u(·), the




The total amounts of money bid in period n by the owner agents, the
firms, and the saver agents, are
An =
∫
aαn dα, Bn =
∫
bφn dφ and Γn =
∫
cγndγ,
respectively. The price pn is formed as the total bid over the total production
pn =
An +Bn + Γn
Qn
.
An equilibrium is constructed as follows. Suppose that all owner agents
begin with cashMA1 = m
A > 0, all saver agents begin with cash MΓ1 = m
Γ ≥
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0, and all firms begin with goods Q1 = q > 0. Thus, the total amount of
cash M1 = MA1 +M
Γ
1 across agents, is equal to
m = mA +mΓ,







, with 0 ≤ ν < 1.
Suppose that the bids of the agents and firms are
a1 = am, b1 = bm, c1 = cm,
that is, proportional to the total amount of cash, so that the price is also
proportional to this amount:




Then the profit of each firm is
Π1 = p1q − (1 + ρ)b1 = (a+ c− ρb)m,
the cash of each owner agent at the beginning of the next period is





and the cash held by each saver agent is











2 = (1 + ρ− ρ(a+ b+ c))m = τm,
where we have set
τ = 1 + ρ− ρ(a+ b+ c).
Define
r =
(1 + ρ)(1− β)
ρ
. (17)
The following theorem was established in [9].
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Theorem 3 Suppose that there exists i∗ with f ′(i∗) = (1+ρ)/β . Then there
is an equilibrium for which, in every period: each firm inputs i∗, produces
q∗ = f(i∗), and bids the amount bn = b∗Mn ; each owner agent bids an =
a∗Mn; and each saver agent bids cn = c∗Mn . Here
a∗ + b∗ + c∗ = r , b∗ =
r
q∗
· i∗ , c∗ = (1− β)ν (18)
and Mn = MAn +M
Γ
n is the amount of cash held across agents in period n.
Furthermore, in each period n: every owner agent consumes the amount
x∗ = (1− ρν
1+ρ
)q∗− i∗; every saver agent consumes the amount y∗ = ( ρν
1+ρ
)q∗;
whereas every firm makes π∗Mn in profits, with π∗ = r − (1 + ρ)b∗.
It is shown in [9] that, in the equilibrium of Theorem 3, the consumption
and total discounted utility of the owner agents are decreasing functions
of ρ, such agents prefer as low an interest rate as possible. Similarly, the
firms also prefer an interest rate as close to zero as possible, in order to
maximize their profits. But the situation of the saver agents is subtler: under
certain configurations of the various parameters of the model (discount factor,
production function, utility function) they prefer as high an interest rate as
possible, whereas under other configurations they settle on an interest rate
ρ∗ ∈ (0,∞) that uniquely maximizes their welfare. Let
τ ∗ = 1 + ρ− ρ(a∗ + b∗ + c∗).
Then money and prices inflate (or deflate) at rate τ ∗ in the equilibrium of
Theorem 3. We also have a∗ + b∗ + c∗ = r, so that the Fisher equation
τ ∗ = β(1 + ρ) holds.
Remark 1 By setting ν = 0 in Theorem 3, we obtain an economy with only
producer firms and owner-consumer agents.8 We will similarly dispense with
saver agents in the models below. This will be useful in illustrating the basic
problems with the circular flow and money supply with innovation in a simple
context. Also we will take τ = β(1 + ρ) = 1 so that there is no inflation.
8Of course, the proportion ν has to be strictly less than one; for otherwise there is no
one to engage in productive activity, own the firms or receive their profits, and the model
unravels.
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6 Innovation in an Asset Poor Economy: Break-
ing the Circular Flow
As in the previous models we aggregate all goods in the model of this section
into a single perishable consumable that is utilized in consumption or pro-
duction or consumed in innovation. There is no capital stock, such as steel
mills. There is no “fat”in the economy, resources for innovation must come
directly out of consumption resources.
6.1 The meaning of an asset poor economy
In actuality a modern economy is rich in real durable assets with a time
profile of durables of many ages that are consumed only in production, not
consumption. Gross Domestic Product may be split into consumption and
investment. If we consider around 70% in consumption, then we note that
at market prices the value of real assets such as steel mills, automobile facto-
ries, houses, automobiles, machinery, land and other consumer durables are
priced probably between 5 to 10 times the value of consumption. None of
these items are meaningfully placed directly in the utility functions of the
individuals. Furthermore, it is the services of consumer durables that are
ultimately valued and not the durables themselves. This is even truer of
items such as steel mills. In the models considered so far we have not in-
dicated that the presence of this large mass of assets owned by individuals
may be such that the loss or exchange of a small percentage of these assets
while pursuing innovation will hardly change the consumption of the owners
of large amounts of real assets.
In a poor country the amount of available assets relative to consump-
tion will be much smaller than in a rich one. We consider in this section
the extreme simplifying case where innovation must come directly out of
consumption. This makes it easier to be specific about the breaking of the
circular flow of capital and the match between real assets and money.
In essence innovation is nothing other than the execution of an idea for a
new process to rearrange and employ existing assets in a different manner.9
It is a breaking of equilibrium that in a rich country calls for an alternative
use for productive assets but does not directly cut down heavily on current
9Bankruptcy in a basic way is similar to innovation in the sense that it involves a
nonequilibrium redeployment of assets.
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consumption. In contrast, in an asset poor economy, an immediate sacrifice
in consumption is called for.
6.2 Innovation in an asset poor economy
We consider a model with a class of identical manufacturers, a class of identi-
cal, individual consumers, who also own the firms, and an outside or central
bank.
One could consider three variants:
1. The managers are in control, the owners are passive and the central
bank is willing to create new money to make investment loans.
2. The managers are in control, the owners are passive and the central
bank does not create new money. It is a flow-through institution
3. The stockholders are in control, they dictate corporate policy, thus the
firms are operationally utility maximizing rather than profit maximiz-
ing. There are at least two possibilities here that need to be distin-
guished (a) the central bank is willing to create new money and the
stockholders cannot create their own credit; and (b) the central bank
is unwilling to create new money and the stockholders can create their
own credit.
All three variants are found in a modern economy. The third is the most
representative of fights for oligopolistic control of the firms by individual
stockholders (in partnership or corporate structure) holding large blocks of
stock, while the remaining stockholders are passive, riding coattails or selling.
We do not construct a mathematical model of this case here. The first
model serves adequately to illustrate the problems with financing and is now
described in detail.
6.2.1 A model with managerial control and central bank lending
As in the model of Section 5.1, there is a continuum of firms φ ∈ J = [0, 1].
Each firm φ begins each period n with goods in process qφn to be sold in
the market, and borrows cash bφn from the central bank to purchase goods
iφn = b
φ
n/pn as input for production. Each firm φ begins in period 1 with no
long term debt, but may borrow an amount of money cφ from the bank to
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purchase goods jφ = cφ/p1 to be used in innovation. The interest on this
long term debt must be paid in every period and the short term loan bφn must
be paid back with interest at the end of each period n. In general, the long
term rate ρ∗ might differ from the short term rate, but it is suffi cient and
simpler to assume that they are equal to a common value ρ ≥ 0. In order
that a firm be able to meet its debt obligations, the bid bφn is restricted to lie
in the interval [0, (p̂nqφn − cφρ)/(1 + ρ)], where p̂n is the bank’s estimate of
the price pn in period n. (In a rational expectations equilibrium, p̂n = pn.)
The bank may also impose an upper limit E on the long term loan cφ.
As in the model of Section 2.2, all firms begin in period 1 with the same





1). However, a successful innovation results in the improved production
function f2. Thus in periods after the first, there are two types of firms -
those of type 1, that failed in the attempt at innovation, and continue with
production function f1, and the type 2 firms, that succeeded, and have f2.
The profit πφn of a firm φ in period n is defined by formula (3) in Section
2.2, and each firm seeks to maximize its total discounted profits (4). The




and is paid to the consumer-owners in equal shares at the end of the period,
as is explained below.
Because we will again look for a type symmetric equilibrium, we will
assume that all firms begin period 1 with the same quantity q1 > 0 of goods,
and we will often omit the superscript φ below. When all firms begin in
the same state, make the same bids b1 and c, and earn the same profit




π1 dφ = π1, Q1 =
∫
q1 dφ = q1.
Suppose W is the overall value of the program to a firm. W1 is the value
after a failed investment, and W2 is the value after a successful investment.
Let ξ(c/p1) = ξ(j) be the probability of success when c/p1 = j is invested in
innovation. Then the value functions satisfy the following optimality equa-
tions.
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for k = 1, 2.
For simplicity we have suppressed super and subscripts above and will
often do so below as well. In both (19) and (20) the notation p̂ is for the
bank’s estimate of the price for goods in the period, whereas p denotes the
price actually formed as will be explained below.
As in Section 2.2 there will be after the first period the fraction ε = ξ(c/p)
of type 2 firms that succeeded at innovation and the fraction ε̄ = 1 − ε of
type 1 firms that failed.
In seeking a type symmetric solution, we will assume that at the begin-
ning of periods n ≥ 2 all firms of type 1(respectively type 2) will hold the
same quantity of goods q1n (respectively q
2
n) and earn the same profit π
1
n (re-
spectively π2n) in the period. Thus the total profit and totals goods in period










In addition to the firms there is also a continuum of consumer-stockholder
agents α ∈ I = [0, 1]. As in the model of Section 5.1 each agent α begins
every period n with cash mαn and bids a
α
n ∈ [0,mαn] to purchase goods aαn/pn
for immediate consumption. The agent deposits the excess cash mαn − aαn in
the bank and gets back (1 + ρ)(mαn − aαn) at the end of the period.
The accounting profit Dn of the bank in period n consists of its earnings
from the loans made to the firms less the interest paid on the deposits of the
owners. Thus








For this model we assume that the profit of the bank, like that of the firms, is
paid to the owners in equal shares at the end of the period. (This assumption
and a possible alternative are discussed in Section 6.2.3 below.) Thus an
owner agent α begins period n+ 1 with cash
mαn+1 = (1 + ρ)(m
α
n − aαn) + Πn +Dn. (22)
The value function V for an owner satisfies








+ βV ((1 + ρ)(m− a) +D + Π)
]
(23)
where u is a concave, nondecreasing utility function and we have again sup-
pressed super and subscripts.
The price pn in each period n is formed as the ratio of the total cash
bid in the goods market to the total amount of goods for sale. In the type
symmetric case, the prices are given by
p1 =











, n ≥ 2.
If m1 = m, then by (22)
m2 = (1 + ρ)(m− a1) + Π1 +D1
= (1 + ρ)(m− a1) + p1q1 − (1 + ρ)b1 − ρc+ ρ · [b1 − (m− a1) + c].
Now p1q1 = a1 + b1 + c. Substitute this into the previous equation and
simplify the result to see that m2 = m+ c. A similar calculation shows that
mn = m+c for all n ≥ 2. Thus in this model the money supply has an initial
increase because of the long-term loan in the first period and then remains
constant.
6.2.2 Stationary equilibrium and the question of convergence
A stationary equilibrium for the economy of the previous section is an equi-
librium in which bids, prices, and the quantities of goods and money remain
constant. The economy experiences a shock due to innovation in the first
period after which there is always a fixed fraction ε̄ of type 1 firms and ε of
type 2 firms. We cannot expect to have a stationary equilibrium until some-
time after the first period. Under some additional regularity assumptions,
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there does exist a type symmetric stationary equilibrium for the economy as
it is configured after the initial shock.
Assume now that the production functions f1, f2 and the utility function
u are strictly concave, continuously differentiable, and that the production
functions satisfy the condition (11) of Section 2.2.1.
Suppose as above that there is a fraction ε̄ of type 1 firms having pro-
duction function f1 and holding goods q1, a fraction ε of type 2 firms having
production function f2 and holding goods q2, and a continuum of consumer-
owner agents α ∈ [0, 1] each with cash m. The argument in Section 2.2.1
using Euler equations works here as well to show that in stationary equi-
librium each type k firm will input the quantity i∗k = (fk)
−1((1 + ρ)2) and
produce q∗k = fk(i
∗
k) in every period.























where β(1 + ρ) = 1 by assumption, and ã and p̃ are the agent’s bid and the
price in the next period. But in stationary equilibrium a = ã and p = p̃. So
the only condition on the optimal bid a∗ is that 0 ≤ a∗ ≤ m.
Let Q∗ = ε̄q∗1 + εq
∗
2 be the total production when firms of type k input i
∗
k





Thus the price must satisfy
p =

















= ε̄(q∗1 − i∗1) + ε(q∗2 − i∗2),
which means that the owner agents consume all the goods produced by the
firms that are not used by the firms as input for production of goods for the
next period.











· [ε̄(q∗1 − i∗1) + ε(q∗2 − i∗2)] < m.
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f ′k(x) dx ≥ f ′k(i∗k) · i∗k = (1 + ρ)2 · i∗k > (1 + ρ) · i∗k.
Thus the quantities q∗k − (1 + ρ)i∗k, k = 1, 2 are strictly positive. Now the




can be rewritten as
ρc ≤ pq∗k − (1 + ρ)b∗k =
m
Q∗
· (q∗k − (1 + ρ)i∗k).
By assumption, the long term debt c cannot exceed the bound E. Thus the





k − (1 + ρ)i∗k
ρQ∗
.
Theorem 4 If the ratio E/m is suffi ciently small, then there is a stationary
equilibrium such that, in every period, each firm of type k inputs i∗k, produces
q∗k = fk(i
∗











1−i∗1)+ε(q∗2−i∗2)]. Furthermore, in every period, every owner-consumer
agent consumes the amount of goods ε̄(q∗1 − i∗1) + ε(q∗2 − i∗2) and every firm of




k − (1 + ρ)i∗k).
Proof. The bids a∗ and b∗k, k = 1, 2 satisfy their Euler equations, and the
appropriate transversality condition is trivial because, by stationarity, the
payoffs are the same in every period.
Recall that Theorem 2 of Section 2.2.1 shows there is convergence to
stationary equilibrium for the open model there. We suspect that an anal-
ogous result holds for the closed model of this section. Even if this is true,
convergence may be slow and a general analytic solution to the model with
innovation seems unlikely. Some simple examples for which convergence is
fast are in Section 6.3 below.
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6.2.3 The modeling of central bank profits
In the model of Section 6.2.1, it is assumed that the amount ρc of long-term
interest is part of the accounting profit Dn (defined in (21)) of the central
bank and is paid in each period to the consumer-owner agents (see (22)). This
is one of several fairly natural models each with different financial, economic
and political implications. One possibility is to neutralize the money as it
comes in, leaving a deflationary trend in place. Other alternatives are for
the bank to subsidize some group of agents with this income, or spend it to
buy resources (such as foreign aid subsidies for purchases in the economy, or
the destruction of government purchases of resources for a foreign war). As
many institutional variants can be defined, the choice among them depends
on the questions to be answered and their empirical relevance.
In order to define the minimal viable model we have collapsed five banking
functions into a single institution. They are:
1. Financing circulating capital or goods in process;
2. Accepting consumer savings;
3. Making short term consumer loans;
4. Making long term investment banking loans;
5. Varying the money supply.
A more detailed model would use at least three institutions: a central
bank, commercial banks, and investment bankers. Here we have chosen a
model with only three types of agents: the firms, the consumer-owners, and
a banking system. This seems to be the minimal number necessary to build a
playable game that illustrates the phenomenon of breaking the circular flow
of capital.
6.3 Two simple examples
In this section equilibria are calculated for two very simple examples. In both
examples the production functions f1 and f2 are defined by the equations (13)
and (15); that is, they are assumed to be the same as those that were used
for the example of Section 2.2.2. Similarly we assume that ρ = ρ∗ = .05 as
in that example and take β = 1/1.05.
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The first example treats a consumer-producer who labors in isolation
to produce goods for his personal consumption and has the opportunity to
innovate. The second example contrasts the first with the situation in a
monetary economy with many firms and owner-consumers.
6.3.1 Robinson Crusoe revisited
Consider first the situation of Robinson Crusoe equipped with the production
function f1 and without the opportunity to innovate. Suppose that Crusoe
begins with a quantity of goods q > 0, selects an amount i, 0 ≤ i ≤ q to put
into production, and consumes the remaining q − i resulting in a utility of
u(q− i). He then begins the next period with goods q̃ = f1(i) and continues
the game.




[u(q − i) + βV1(f1(i))].
For simplicity we assume that Crusoe is risk neutral with utility function
u(q) = q.
It is not diffi cult to check that a stationary equilibrium has q = 2 and








1− 1/1.05 = 21.
Similarly, if Crusoe begins with the production function f2, a stationary




βn−1u(2− 1/2) = 3/2
1− 1/1.05 = 31.5.
Next assume that Crusoe begins with q = 2 and the production function
f1, but has the opportunity to invest a portion of his goods in an attempt
at innovation. Suppose further that the opportunity to innovate can be
represented by a binary lottery ticket that can be obtained by utilizing j =
1/2 units of input material. The ticket is such that with probability 1/2 the
innovation succeeds and Crusoe has the production function f2 thereafter,
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but also with probability 1/2 it fails and Crusoe must continue with f1. Let
V = V (2) be the value of this new game.
Now Crusoe can reject the investment opportunity and continue with his
original production function f1 thereby earning V1(2) = 21, or make the
































{21 + 31.5} = 25.5.
Since 25.5 > 21, it pays the non-monetary Crusoe to innovate. A smaller
value for the discount factor β, say β = . 8, would go against innovation.
We now split Crusoe into two and place him in a monetary economy. The
resource base per capita remains the same but, prior to innovation, Crusoe
is in an economy that uses fiat money but has no commercial bank and
in a stationary equilibrium only implicitly needs the services of the central
banks as no more money enters or leaves the economy. This changes with
innovation.
6.3.2 A simple monetary economy
The following is an example of the model with many firms and consumer
owners that was presented abstractly in Section 6.2.
Let m = 1 be the amount of money held initially by the consumers, and
suppose that the firms begin with goods q = 2 and the production function
f1. Assume first that the firms do not attempt to innovate. The optimal
input for the firms is 1 unit of goods. Thus, if the price of goods is p, the
firms borrow and then bid b = p thereby obtaining i = b/p = 1 as input in
order to produce q̃ = f1(1) = 2 for the next period. The (short-term) loan
to the firms is financed by the deposit of m− a = b of the owner-consumers.














The economy is in stationary equilibrium and each period the firms earn the
profit
π = pq − (1 + ρ)b = 1
2












· π = 9.975. (25)
The consumers, like Crusoe in the previous example, are assumed to be risk
neutral with utility function u(q) = q. In each period they receive in utility




βn−1u(1) = 21. (26)
Now suppose that the firms have the opportunity to innovate. The phys-
ical aspects of the economy will be the same as for Crusoe in the previous
example, but prices and money will now play a role.
By investing 1/2 unit of goods, each firm can, independently of the oth-
ers, purchase a lottery that with probability 1/2 results in the improved
production function f2 for the firm, but also with probability 1/2 fails caus-
ing the firm to continue with f1. The question for the managers of the firms
is whether they can improve upon the return achievable without making the
attempt at innovation.
To answer this question, assume that the firms do purchase the lottery.
Suppose that the price of goods in the first period is p. The firms will need
to bid b + c = p + p/2 = 1.5p in order to purchase 1 unit of goods as input
for production and 1/2 unit for the innovation attempt. The short-term loan
of b = p is again financed by the consumer-owners who bid a and deposit
m−a = b = p as before. However, the bid c = p/2 is financed by a long-term
bank loan which must be repaid over the infinite future in payments of ρc in











So the price is p = 2/3, and b = 2/3, a = 1− p = 1/3 = c. The firms earn in
the first period the profit
π = pq − (1 + ρ)b− ρc = 2
3
· 2− 1.05 · 2
3
− .05 · 1
3
= .6167.
The owner-consumers receive in the first period





In all subsequent periods the unsuccessful firms called type 1 with pro-
duction function f1 bid b1 = p in order to input 1 unit of goods while the
successful firms called type 2 with production function f2 bid b2 = p/2 in
order to input 1/2. As before these short-term loans are financed by the
owner-consumers, who now hold cash m + c = 1 + 1/3 = 4/3. So they
deposit




























that is, the price equals 2/3 in every period. (One should not expect constant
prices in general. This example was constructed to make for a simple analy-
sis.) Notice that because of the constant price and the constant derivative
u′ = 1, the Euler equation (24) is satisfied at every stage.
In periods after the first the type 1 firms have the profit
π1 = pq − (1 + ρ)b1 − ρc =
2
3
· 2− 1.05 · 2
3
− .05 · 1
3
= .6167,
type 2 firms make
π2 = pq − (1 + ρ)b2 − ρc =
2
3
· 2− 1.05 · 1
3








The total expected value to a firm is





























· 21 · .6167 + 1
2
· 21 · .9667
}
= 16.4507.
Since 16.4507 > 9.975, the innovation lottery is good for the firms.








which is greater than 21. So the lottery is good for consumers also.
33
6.3.3 Innovation financed by a money market
In the economy of Section 6.2.1 as in the example of Section 6.3.2, the attempt
at innovation is financed by the bank with an an injection of additional
money into the system. It is also possible to construct examples for which
innovation is financed by a money market with loans made to the firms from
the consumer-owners and the quantity of money remains fixed. We suspect
that there are also examples where there is an equilibrium with innovation
when there are additional funds available from a bank and that innovation
will not occur without such additional funds.
6.4 A comment on monied individuals: Retirees or ac-
tive capitalists?
In Section 5.1 we considered a model with a class of individuals whose only
asset was government money. Because the solution supported the fiat as both
a means of payment and a store of value these individuals were able to live
off their money. In the model of Section 6.2, our main concern being central
bank financing, we omitted them for simplicity.
The introduction of a class of agents living offmoney provides for a basic
reconsideration of the role of finance in the economy. In particular their
interest in influencing a government set rate of interest may be diametrically
opposed to the desires of the producers.
Is a retired surgeon with $10,000,000 the economic equivalent of a pro-
fessional money lender with $10,000,000? Almost always the answer is no.
Information, evaluation, expertise, and specialization of the financial func-
tions are in essence an evolutionary aspect of the overall body economic.
The essential difference between a merely rich amateur investor and a pro-
fessional is perception, expertise, knowledge and a network of professional
connections. The professional investor is part of the general sensory system
of the economy dealing in the perception and evaluation of risk in a dynamic
economy. The rich retiree is better off investing indirectly though a profes-
sional investor be it a bank, investment bank, or other financial professional
unless she has a network of connections of her own that enable her to invest
directly in a family’s or friend’s business.
The remarks above imply that at least we should split the savers in the
model of Section 5.1 into two parts, passive savers and active financiers.
The savers deposit only in the commercial banks or pension funds, while the
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financiers are involved in evaluation and deal directly with the firms and the
markets for firms and their stocks. The consideration of such a model is left
for a future project.
7 Ongoing Innovation Opportunities
In this, Part 2 of our consideration of the financing of innovation, we confined
our observations to models with randomness only at the initial stage. In
essence we were able to utilize a modification of two dynamic programming
models with independent agents each facing only one stochastic element at
the start. Even with the piling up of gross simplifications the conditions
needed to be able to obtain a stationary state involved an adjustment period
of arbitrarily length. With a random variable each period the turbulence will
increase considerably and the characterization of even the simplest market
with innovation with a random element in each period will lead to a path
dependent distribution of firm size and stochastically increasing returns of
the variety indicated by Brian Arthur [1]. We intend to pursue the possibility
of an ongoing innovation process in a separate essay.
8 Summary Remarks
Our basic goal was to produce an adequate mathematical model that could
reflect mathematically the meaning of Schumpeter’s breaking of the circular
flow of capital in a closed economy. There are several other basic features
that static or even dynamic conventional equilibrium models cannot capture:
1. Innovation and comparative statics: Innovation requires an extra process
that utilizes existing resources. This is illustrated here by a comparative
analysis of two economies, one with and the other without innovation
in Sections 6 and 5, respectively.
2. Robinson Crusoe and the parallel worlds of goods and finance: An
understanding of Robinson Crusoe’s innovation opportunities provides
a clear preliminary way to understand the roles of real resources and
ownership control prior to seeing the strategic decoupling offered by
money and the financial system in a complex economy [9].
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3. The problem of convergence to stationary equilibrium even with only
one random event: Under reasonable assumptions the open economy
of Section 2 converges to stationary equilibrium after an initial shock
due to innovation. It remains open whether the same is true for the
closed economy of Section 6. If so, the rate of convergence will no doubt
depend on the specific structures of production and consumption.
4. Financing and two way causality: The availability of extra goods may
bring forth a demand for extra money; however the financing of inno-
vation may be generated by the availability of extra money or credit.
Thus causality may go in both directions.
5. Bankruptcy as the delimiter of risk: Bankruptcy laws are a logical ne-
cessity needed to account for the possibility of failure. If innovation
fails and individuals are bankrupted their remaining resources may be
redistributed to cover in part the contractual obligations. Thus from
the viewpoint of society as a whole the bankruptcy laws are a pub-
lic good delineating how much the economy as a whole shares in the
outcome from the individual gamble.
By selecting a bankruptcy penalty greater than or equal to the high-
est marginal utility of money on an equilibrium path and limiting the
amounts that individuals borrow, we can avoid in our models solutions
involving active bankruptcy.
6. The locus of innovation finance may be public or private: Historically
both private and public resources have been involved in innovation.
Global exploration and then space exploration were heavily government
enterprises to start with and the private sector followed. This is also
true for the internet.
This paper was basically aimed at understanding the nature of the cash
flows in innovation. As such we purposely played down the distribution of
power and wealth masking it by extreme aggregation.These factors require a
separate treatment.
9 Appendix: The Proof of Theorem 2
Here the notation and assumptions are those of Section 2, and, in particular,
Section 2.2.1. Consider an economy as in that section with two types of firm
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at the beginning of a period in which every type 1 firm holds the quantity of
goods q1 and every type 2 firm holds the quantity q2 with the total quantity
of goods being Q = ε̄q1 + εq2.
By equation (3) in Section 2.2.1,
f ′1(i1) = f
′




where ik = bk/p, k = 1, 2 and Q̃ is the total quantity of goods at the beginning
of the next period. Moreover,
Q̃ = ε̄f1(i1) + εf2(i2)
because q̃k = fk(ik) is the quantity of goods held by firms of type k at the
beginning of the next period.
It follows from our assumptions on f1 and f2 that, for every positive value
of i1 there is a unique positive value of i2 such that f ′1(i1) = f
′
2(i2). Also this
value of i2 is a continuous, increasing function of i1 and approaches∞ when
i1 does.
Consider now the function
λ(i1) = f
′
1(i1) · Φ(Q̃) = f ′1(i1) · Φ(ε̄f1(i1) + εf2(i2))
where i2 has the value described in the previous paragraph. The function
λ is continuous and decreases from +∞ to 0 on [0,+∞). Hence, for each
positive Q, there are unique positive numbers i1 = i1(Q) and i2 = i2(Q) such





1(i1(Q)) · Φ(ε̄f1(i1(Q)) + εf2(i2(Q))) = (1 + ρ)2 · Φ(Q).
Thus we can define the mapping ψ from the current value for the total
quantity of goods Q to the quantity Q̃ for the next period by
ψ(Q) = ε̄f1(i1(Q)) + εf2(i2(Q)) = Q̃.
The mapping ψ provides a law of motion for the economy when firms choose
their bids in agreement with the Euler equations.
Lemma 5 1. The functions i1(Q), i2(Q) and ψ(Q) are continuous, increas-
ing functions of Q on (0,∞).
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where i∗k = (fk)
−1((1 + ρ)2), k = 1, 2.
3. If 0 < Q < Q∗, then Q ≤ ψ(Q) ≤ Q∗; if Q∗ < Q, then Q∗ ≤ ψ(Q) ≤ Q.
4. For Q > 0, ψn(Q) → Q∗ as n → ∞, where ψn is the n-fold composition
of ψ with itself.




To see that i1 is increasing, let 0 < Q1 < Q2. Then
λ(i1(Q1)) = (1 + ρ)
2Φ(Q1) > (1 + ρ)
2Φ(Q2) = λ(i1(Q2)).
Since λ is decreasing, i1(Q1) < i1(Q2). Also i2(Q) is an increasing function
of i1(Q). So i2(Q1) < i2(Q2).
Finally, because f1, f2 are increasing, we have
ψ(Q1) = ε̄f1(i1(Q1)) + εf2(i2(Q1)) < ε̄f1(i1(Q2)) + εf2(i2(Q2)) = ψ(Q2).
2. The quantity Q is a fixed point of ψ means that
ψ(Q) = ε̄f1(i1(Q)) + εf2(i2(Q)) = Q,
which is equivalent to
λ(i1(Q)) = f
′
1(i1(Q)) · Φ(Q) = (1 + ρ)2 · Φ(Q).
This holds if and only if
f ′1(i1(Q)) = (1 + ρ)
2 = f ′2(i2(Q)),
that is, i1(Q) = i∗1 and i2(Q) = i
∗





3. Let 0 < Q < Q∗. By parts 1 and 2, we have
ψ(Q) ≤ ψ(Q∗) = Q∗.
Moreover,








The inequality above holds because i1(Q) ≤ i1(Q∗) = i∗1 by part 1 of the
theorem and thus f ′1(i1(Q)) ≥ f ′1(i∗1) = (1 + ρ)2.
The proof for the case when Q∗ < Q is similar.











By part 2, L = Q∗.
To complete the proof of Theorem 2, suppose that the firms always make
bids in agreement with the Euler equations. Let Qn be the total quantity
of goods in period n. Then by part 4 of the lemma, Qn = ψ
n−1(Q1) → Q∗.
Also, if pn is the price in period n, then pn = Φ(Qn)→ Φ(Q∗) = p∗, because
























So bk,n → b∗k, and the proof is complete.
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